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A B S T R A C T
A widespread and pessimistic view of the availability of mineral commodities calls for strong government in-
itiatives to ensure adequate future supplies. This article provides a more market oriented and optimistic per-
spective, one that focuses on production costs and prices rather than physical availability. It sees short-run
shortages continuing to plague commodity markets in the future as in the past. Though painful while they last,
these shortages are temporary and do not pose a serious long-run threat to human welfare. Moreover, even
without government intervention, they self-correct. The sharply higher prices that they evoke create strong
incentives that foster supply and curb demand.
Potentially more serious are long-run shortages due to mineral depletion. Such shortages are often thought to
be inevitable, a conclusion that ﬂows directly from the physical view of depletion. For various reasons, we reject
this view of depletion in favor of an economic view. The latter recognizes that depletion may create long-run
shortages, but stresses that this need not be the case if new technology can continue to oﬀset the cost-increasing
eﬀects of depletion in the future as it has in the past. The economic view also suggests that a list of mineral
commodities most threatened by depletion can best be compiled using cumulative availability curves rather than
the more common practice of calculating commodity life expectancies based on estimates of available stocks.
1. Introduction
A recent issue of Nature carries an article entitled ‘Mineral supply
for sustainable development requires resource governance’ by Ali et al.
(2017). It paints a rather troubling picture of the availability of copper
in particular and other metals and mineral commodities in general over
the next half century. The challenges that it highlights are numerous
and fall into three broad categories—(1) rapid demand growth caused
by rising global population as well as the increased material needs for
climate change policies and UN sustainable development goals; (2)
constraints on supply arising from inadequate investment in explora-
tion and new capacity, growing community resistance to mining, gov-
ernance problems in many host countries, long gestation periods for
new mines, growing government regulations to protect the environ-
ment and for other reasons, and declining amounts of identiﬁed mineral
resources; and (3) the inability of recycling and secondary production
to contribute greatly to mineral commodity supply until the middle of
the 21st century, given that much of the copper and other materials
currently in buildings and other products will not be available for re-
cycling for some time.
To mitigate and avoid future supply crises, the article recommends
the adoption of various public policies, including international targets
for global mineral production, common standards to ensure maximum
eﬃciency and minimum environmental damage, support for new ex-
traction technologies, harmonization of best practices, and greater
public-private cooperation. Their article concludes with the sentence:
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“Ultimately, international legal mechanisms may be needed to antici-
pate and respond to future mineral availability constraints”.
The authors are scientists and engineers with expertise from across a
spectrum of ﬁelds. In this respect, their paper reﬂects an inter-
disciplinary perspective. It also reﬂects a widely shared, rather pessi-
mistic outlook on the future availability of mineral commodities and
hence the need for strong corrective government measures.1
There is, however, a diﬀerent perspective, strongly supported by
historical experience, which many geoscientists, economists, policy
analysts, mineral industry executives, and others (including all of us)
believe provides a more useful and appropriate framework for assessing
the future availability of mineral commodities.2 It is more market fo-
cused and less pessimistic—indeed, it is modestly optimistic about the
future. It sees an important role for governments and public policy in
ensuring adequate future mineral commodity supplies, a role that
overlaps with the policy recommendations of the more pessimistic
perspective but one that also diverges in a number of important re-
spects.
2. The market-focused and modestly optimistic perspective
Our modestly optimistic perspective concentrates much more on
prices and much less on physical availability. What matters for society,
this view maintains, is how much we have to give up to obtain an ad-
ditional barrel of oil or pound of copper. So increasing scarcity and
declining availability are deﬁned as either (a) a sharp jump in price
over the short run or (b) a persistent increase in real (i.e., inﬂation-
adjusted) price over the long run that slowly but persistently squeezes
traditional users out of the market.
This perspective, it is worth noting, does not assume that a peak in
production followed by declining output is necessarily an omen of a
present or future shortage. Such peaks may simply reﬂect falling de-
mand.3 In the early 20th century, for example, the mining of nitrates
(saltpeter), used largely in fertilizers and explosives, collapsed thanks to
the successful eﬀorts of German chemists to develop synthetic sub-
stitutes. Similarly, it was falling demand—largely the result of gov-
ernment regulations motivated by public health concerns—rather than
supply constraints, that precipitated the drop in asbestos and mercury
production over the past half century.
A case can even be made that the peak in U.S. petroleum production
in the early 1970s, so famously predicted by Hubbert (1962), was the
result of falling demand for domestic oil as cheaper sources became
available from abroad, just as cheaper production from U.S. shale de-
posits increased the demand for domestic oil and reversed the down-
ward trend during the early 21st century.
The modestly optimistic perspective also makes a clear distinction
between short-run or temporary shortages (which rarely last more than
a decade and often only a few months or years) and long-run (possibly
permanent) shortages. The two are quite diﬀerent.
Temporary shortages take place with some frequency and for a
variety of reasons. Unexpected surges in global demand, inadequate
investment in exploration and new capacity, the control of supply by
cartels, wars, interruptions in trade, embargos, government ﬁats, mine
accidents, and strikes can all cause severe short-run increases in mineral
commodity prices. Recent illustrations include the surge in global
commodity demand in the early years of this century due to the rapid
growth of the Chinese economy, the fears over export restrictions on
rare-earth minerals imposed in 2010 by the same country, and the
Indonesian ban on exports of unprocessed ores of nickel and other
mineral commodities since 2014.
Such shortages can be quite painful while they last, but they seldom
persist for long thanks to what Wellmer and Dalheimer (2012) call the
benevolent feedback control cycle of mineral supply. Shortages contain
the seeds of their own destruction. In response to sharply higher prices,
consumers develop and use alternative materials or simply ﬁnd ways to
produce their products with less material input. Simultaneously, higher
prices encourage investors to expand existing sources of primary
supply, to ﬁnd and develop new sources, and to increase recycling and
secondary production.
Long-run shortages are in almost all respects quite diﬀerent. They
produce rising trends in real prices over many decades, rather than
sharp surges for a few months or years. As a result, they pose, at least
potentially, a much more serious threat to the well being of the human
race. In the past, they have occurred infrequently; so infrequently that it
is diﬃcult to identify any such shortages with certainty. The available
studies, and there are many, ﬁnd both downward and level long-run
trends. What they do not ﬁnd are mineral commodities for which real
prices have risen signiﬁcantly over the past 100 to 150 years.4
Fig. 1 shows the average annual real prices from 1900 to 2016 for
ﬁve important metals—aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc. The
prices for these metals are highly volatile over the short run, rising
dramatically during economic booms and falling sharply during reces-
sions, but their long-run trends are either downward (aluminum) or
more or less ﬂat (copper, lead, nickel, and zinc).
Why do we not ﬁnd rising long-run trends in real prices? New
technologies, discovered deposits, and other innovations have oﬀset, or
more than oﬀset, the cost-increasing eﬀects of more stringent govern-
ment regulations, rising real wages, and especially mineral depletion. If
this favorable situation continues in the future, then some mineral
commodities will become more available (or less scarce), while the
availability of others will remain more or less the same. Of course, it is
possible that the discovery of new deposits and innovation will fail to
oﬀset the upward pressure on costs from mineral depletion and other
forces. In this case, society will have to pay more for its mineral raw
materials.
3. Policy implications for short-run shortages
The modestly optimistic perspective does recognize that govern-
ment intervention is needed to correct serious market failures. For the
mineral sector, a particularly pervasive market failure arises from what
economists call externalities. Externalities occur whenever an activity
by an individual or ﬁrm creates (a) costs to society that the individual
or ﬁrm does not pay for or (b) beneﬁts that it does not capture.
Examples of the former are air and water pollution and, of particular
concern these days, greenhouse gas emissions. Private ﬁrms cannot be
expected to curtail their pollution to socially optimal levels unless
public policy requires their competitors to do the same. So, clearly,
sustainable mineral commodity production requires appropriate en-
vironmental regulations.
Similarly, public support is needed for education and for R&D, be-
cause the expected beneﬁts to society from these activities far exceed
those that the ﬁrms, institutions, and individuals responsible for these
activities can capture. For the mineral sector, this means that govern-
ments have an important role to play in supporting educational and
innovative activities from exploration through recycling. For the same
reason, public policies are needed to support geologic mapping and
other early stages of exploration (Herﬁndahl and Kneese, 1974; Duke,
1 Elshkaki et al. (2016), Henckens et al. (2016), and Svedrup and Ragnarsdóttir (2014)
are other recent examples of this perspective and provide references to other studies in
this genre. Earlier studies include U.S. President's Materials Policy Commission (The Paley
Commission) (1952), Gordon et al. (1987), Gordon et al. (2006), and Northey et al.
(2014).
2 Arndt et al. (2017) and chapter 9 of Tilton and Guzmán (2016) provide examples of
this view of the future availability of mineral commodities as well as references to other
studies with a similar perspective.
3 According to Wellmer and Scholz (2017), most peaks in mineral production are the
result of reductions in demand rather than supply constraints.
4 Chapter 8 in Radetzki and Wårell (2017) discusses long-run trends in the real prices of
mineral commodities and provides references to other relevant studies.
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2010), as well as the collection and public dissemination of mineral
industry data important to the national economy and national security.5
Other than to address such signiﬁcant market failures, however,
proponents of the modestly optimistic perspective are inclined to rely
on markets to ensure future mineral commodity supplies. They are re-
luctant to have governments set output goals, require particular pro-
duction methods, encourage recycling beyond what is economically
justiﬁed, promote the use of renewable over non-renewable resources,
and in other ways substitute public for private decision making.
As noted earlier, the modestly optimistic perspective makes a clear
distinction between temporary and long-run, possibly permanent,
shortages. Temporary shortages have plagued the mineral industries
since at least the Industrial Revolution and are due to the inherent
nature of short-run mineral supply and demand. Once full capacity is
reached, supply is more or less unresponsive to increases in price. The
same is often true for demand as well. This is in part because the cost of
a mineral commodity often accounts for a small percentage of the price
of the ﬁnal products in which it is embodied, and in part because the
opportunities to substitute one material for another are, for various
reasons, limited in the short run (Tilton and Guzmán, 2016, ch. 2). This
means that both the short-run supply and demand curves are very steep.
So a shift in either causes the market-clearing price to change greatly.
Mergers, cartels, producer-consumer agreements, and other eﬀorts,
both by private ﬁrms and governmental bodies, to cope with this vo-
latility date back centuries, possibly even millennia. The formation of
U.S. Steel in the early 19th century, often described as a merger of
mergers and at the time the largest corporation in the United States,
was in part motivated by the desire to eliminate or at least dampen the
violent cyclical swings in steel prices that plagued the second half of the
19th century. More recent examples include OPEC (the Organization of
the Petroleum Exporting Countries), CIPEC (the Intergovernmental
Council of Copper Exporting Countries), IBA (the International Bauxite
Association), APEF (the Association of Iron Ore Exporting Countries),
and the six International Tin Agreements. Such eﬀorts have seldom
succeeded for more than a few years, and very rarely for more than a
decade.
More eﬀective measures for coping with this inherent volatility are
stockpiling in anticipation of shortages and shifting the risk of price
changes via hedging and other ﬁnancial derivatives to those more able
and willing to accept it. On occasions, public stockpiles make sense,
particularly when national strategic interests are at stake. Often,
though, decisions to stockpile or hedge are best made by those private
interests that shortages are most likely to aﬀect. There is little to suggest
that public oﬃcials are any better at anticipating unexpected shifts in
demand or supply than the private entities that produce and consume
mineral commodities.
4. Policy implications for long-run shortages
Particularly interesting and important diﬀerences emerge between
our modestly optimistic perspective and the more pessimistic perspec-
tive with regard to long-run shortages and the threat of depletion.
4.1. Competing paradigms
The more pessimistic perspective typically relies on a physical view
of depletion, what mineral economists call the ﬁxed-stock paradigm of
depletion (Tilton and Lagos, 2007). Since the earth is ﬁnite, it follows
logically that the supply of any mineral commodity is limited, as it is
produced from a resource of given and limited quantity. Diﬀerent
measures are used to estimate this quantity, among them resources,
reserves,6 and remaining ultimately recoverable resources (URR).7 For
example, the Ali et al. (2017) study, cited at the beginning of this ar-
ticle, uses a model designed to reﬂect the peak in copper production
during the 2020s that Northey et al. (2014) anticipate. The latter de-
rives this peak using estimates of the available copper stock based on
data for the remaining URR.
While the resources extracted to create supply are a ﬁxed stock,
production and consumption are ﬂow variables. They continue year
after year, possibly accelerating over time, particularly if population
and per capita consumption are growing. Given these assumptions,
long-run shortages are inevitable. Eventually the available stocks will
be consumed. One can calculate the life expectancies of mineral com-
modities using estimates of their available stocks and future con-
sumption. For copper, for example, at current rates of primary pro-
duction, reported reserves and resources would last about 40 and 300
years, respectively.8
To postpone the day of reckoning, many proponents of the more
pessimistic perspective favor public policies that encourage recycling,
conservation, and the substitution of renewables for mineral resources.
With some justiﬁcation, they are skeptical that current prices provide a
reliable indicator of future scarcity. Rather, they ﬂag mineral com-
modities with relatively short life expectancies as those most vulnerable
to shortages and most in need of immediate attention.
Advocates of the modestly optimistic perspective advocate a
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Fig. 1. Index of real prices for aluminum, copper, lead, nickel, and zinc, 1900–2016 (100
= Average of 2000–2009 prices). Notes and Sources: All prices are given in US dollars per
metric ton. The source for copper prices from 1960 and aluminum, lead, nickel and zinc
prices from 1980 is the London Metal Exchange (annual average cash settlement prices of
the prevailing shapes and grades in each year). Prices of copper and lead until July 1993,
and of zinc until September 1988, were quoted in sterling. They have been converted to
US dollars at the exchange rates ruling at the time. The basis of the zinc price moved from
standard high grade in September 1980 and to special high grade in January 1990. The
copper quotation moved from electrolytic wirebars to copper higher grade in December
1981 and to Copper Grade A on June 30, 1986. Prices for the remaining years for each
metal are United States’ quotations and are from Schmitz (1979). Nominal prices are
converted to real prices using the US implicit GDP price deﬂator for the years 1929–2016.
For earlier years the deﬂator is the US wholesale price index from Historical Statistics of the
United States.
5 Chapter 5 of U.S. National Research Council, Committee on Critical Mineral Impacts
on the U.S. Economy (2008) provides a strong rationale for government support in
gathering and disseminating mineral information and data.
6 The U.S. Geological Survey (annual) provides data on reserves (the quantity of a
mineral commodity contained in discovered deposits that are currently proﬁtable to ex-
ploit) and limited information on resources (the quantity of a mineral commodity found
in deposits, both identiﬁed and undiscovered, whose economic extraction is currently or
potentially feasible).
7 Mudd and Weng (2012) describes a more recent method to measure the availability of
copper, referred to as remaining ultimately recoverable resources. This approach iden-
tiﬁes all known copper deposits, estimates the total copper these deposits contained prior
to any mining, and ﬁnally calculates the quantity of copper remaining in these deposits.
8 U.S. Geological Survey (annual) provides the data on production, reserves, and re-
sources used to calculate these life expectancies.
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diﬀerent view of depletion. They acknowledge the logic of the physical
view—clearly, since the earth is ﬁnite, the amount of any material
found in the earth has to be ﬁnite as well—but for several reasons be-
lieve as a guide to public policy the physical view is seriously ﬂawed.
First, many mineral commodities are not destroyed when used. The
earth contains as much copper today as it ever has with the possible
exception of the miniscule quantities shot into space. And, even these
amounts have presumably been more than replaced by the copper in the
roughly 40 thousand tons of interstellar dust penetrating the Earth's
atmosphere every year (Taylor et al., 1996).
Second, most mineral commodities have substitutes in many end
uses. If petroleum, which is destroyed when used as a fuel, becomes
scarce causing its price to rise over time, society will at some point
switch to other sources of energy—solar power, for example, whose
availability for all practical purposes is unlimited.
Third, the physical quantities of various mineral commodities con-
tained in the earth are huge. The copper in the earth's crust, for ex-
ample, would last 84 million years at current production rates. For
aluminum, the ﬁgure is 7.7 billion years.9 If physical existence were the
relevant constraint on future production, we would have more pressing
problems to address.
However, long before society extracted the last ton of copper in the
earth's crust, the costs of extraction would rise, extinguishing demand
in one end use after another until at some point production ceased. So
physical existence is not the relevant constraint. For this reason, pro-
ponents of the modestly optimistic perspective prefer an economic view
of depletion, what mineral economists call the opportunity cost paradigm
of depletion, over the physical view.
The economic view focuses on what society has to give up or sa-
criﬁce to obtain another barrel of oil or ton of copper. Typically, this
opportunity cost is measured by diﬀerences and trends in real prices.
The diﬀerence between the price of copper and gold today reﬂects the
fact that copper is less scarce than gold. The decline in the real price of
aluminum over the past century indicates that this material has actually
become more available (less scarce) despite the extraction of many tons
of low-cost reserves.
With the economic view, shortages due to mineral depletion are no
longer inevitable. The future depends largely on the balance between
the cost-increasing eﬀects of depletion and the cost-reducing eﬀects of
new technology. In the past, as noted, new technology has oﬀset or
more than oﬀset the negative eﬀects of depletion. This could continue
to be the case in the future, though of course this is not a certainty.
The preceding suggests that the best weapon society has in its ar-
senal for coping with the threat of depletion is research and devel-
opment—aimed at enhancing and increasing primary production from
lower quality resources with less environmental damage, increasing
manufacturing eﬃciency and recycling, and developing substitutes. In
other words, innovation to produce more, waste less, and use less of a
material. It is new technology that has kept depletion at bay in the past
and has the potential to do so in the future. Other measures, such as
slowing primary production by promoting conservation, recycling, and
the substitution of renewable for non-renewable resources beyond what
is economic, can delay the day of reckoning but oﬀer no hope of
eliminating it.
It is important to note that public policies designed to alter market
behavior, such as sponsoring R&D or promoting recycling beyond what
the market would undertake by itself, require valuable public resources.
These resources come with a cost, since they could otherwise be used to
promote other social goals, such as education and public health.
4.2. Assessing the threat
The economic view of depletion also suggests a quite diﬀerent
methodology for identifying those mineral commodities that depletion
most threatens. As noted earlier, the physical view relies on life ex-
pectancies based on estimates of future consumption and the available
stocks. This approach falters because the estimates used for the avail-
able stock, such as reserves and even resources, are not truly ﬁxed
stocks. Reserves, as is well known, often increase over time thanks to
exploration and discoveries at both greenﬁeld and brownﬁeld sites.10
New technologies that permit the proﬁtable exploitation of previously
uneconomic deposits are also an important source of new reserves.
Resources are deﬁned as the quantity of a mineral commodity
contained in deposits, both identiﬁed and undiscovered, whose eco-
nomic extraction is currently or potentially feasible. Yet, they too
change over time, largely in response to technological developments
that make economic extraction appear potentially feasible where pre-
viously this was not the case. For example, seabed mining of copper and
other mineral commodities is now considered a future probability. For
such reasons, the U.S. Geological Survey estimates of copper resources
have risen from 2.3 billion tons in 2000 to 5.6 billion tons today (U.S.
Geological Survey, annual), more than doubling within 20 years. This
ﬁgure climbs to 6.4 billion tons if one includes new estimates of un-
discovered porphyry and sediment-hosted copper deposits along with
the other kinds of undiscovered copper-bearing deposits (Singer, 2017).
While the quantity of copper contained in the earth's crust is more
or less ﬁxed, as noted previously, using this quantity as the available
stock to estimate copper's life expectancy—some 84 million years at
current rates of extraction—is clearly unhelpful, as most of this copper
with high certainty will remain forever uneconomic to mine.
So, in place of life expectancies, the economic view of depletion
argues for focusing on mineral commodities whose real production
costs and in turn prices are likely to rise signiﬁcantly over the coming
decades and centuries. This, as noted, depends largely on the balance
over time between the cost-increasing eﬀects of depletion and the cost-
reducing eﬀects of technology. Since the future course of technological
change is unknown and presumably unknowable, one might conclude
that it simply is not possible to identify the mineral commodities most
vulnerable to shortages over the long run. It turns out, however, that
the situation is not quite as hopeless as it may at ﬁrst appear.
4.3. The cumulative availability curve
The cumulative availability curve shows the total quantities of a
mineral commodity, such as copper, that can be produced economically
at various prices with today's technology and other conditions (such as
wage rates and other input prices).11,12 Fig. 2a illustrates such a curve.
As price rises, the number of economic deposits increases and, along
with it, the amount of copper in these deposits classiﬁed as economic.
As drawn in Fig. 2a, this curve indicates that the copper available
not only increases with price but increases at an increasing rate. This
need not be the case. When the demand for a commodity now produced
as a byproduct, such as germanium or gallium, rises suﬃciently to re-
quire its extraction as a main product, costs may jump dramatically.
In the case of copper, Skinner (1976) has argued that, once the
sulﬁde and oxide minerals from which we now produce copper are
depleted, we may have to extract copper from silicate minerals. This
9 Tilton and Guzmán (2016, ch. 9) provides life expectancies of reserves and resources
for a number of mineral commodities based on data from the U.S. Geological Survey.
10 For an interesting discussion of how copper reserves at one particular mine, the El
Teniente Mine in Chile, have changed over the past century, see Radetzki (2009).
11 Tilton and Skinner (1987) provides an early discussion of the cumulative availability
curve. This and other early references to the cumulative availability curve use the term
the cumulative supply curve.
12 Babitzke et al. (1982) describes the Minerals Availability System, a major and early
eﬀort to estimate cumulative availability curves for a large number of mineral com-
modities undertaken by the U.S. Bureau of Mines during the 1970s and 1980s.
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could cause costs to surge for two reasons. Ore grades are likely to drop
requiring the mining of many more tons of material per ton of copper
recovered; and the technologies available to process silicate ores will
probably require much more energy input per ton of output. Sharply
higher costs would produce a discrete jump or an upward surge in the
cumulative availability curve, as illustrated in Fig. 2b and c.
The cumulative availability curve is a useful expository device. It
allows one to place all the factors inﬂuencing the long-run future course
of any mineral commodity's real price into three categories. First, there
are the geologic and environmental considerations—the number,
nature, quality, byproducts, and accessibility of the identiﬁed resources
from which the commodity can be produced, as well as (at least in
principle) an estimate of the external costs associated with production
of a mineral resource. These determine the shape of the curve. Second,
there are all the forces that govern how rapidly society moves up the
curve. Here we ﬁnd the change in demand for a mineral commodity
(which depends on changes in global population, per capita income,
consumer preferences, and the technologies used to produce consumer
goods and services) as well as trends in recycling and secondary pro-
duction. Finally, there are the forces that cause the curve to shift over
time, such as new technology and changes in input costs. Since new
technology is adopted only if it reduces production costs (including
negative externalities, such as environmental pollution), the cumulative
availability curve is likely to shift downward over the long run. For a
time, though, a surge in input costs or more stringent government
regulations could push it upward.
We know that the future course of real mineral commodity prices
will reﬂect all three of these considerations—the shape of the cumu-
lative availability curve, the speed with which society moves up the
curve, and the extent to which the curve shifts. We also know that these
two last considerations—the speed society moves up the curve and
shifts in the curve—depend on future developments that are for the
most part not only unknown but unknowable.
This is not the case, however, for the ﬁrst consideration—the shape
of the curve. It depends as noted on the nature and incidence of existing
resources created by geologic processes in the distant past. For many
mineral commodities, the information needed to construct their cu-
mulative availability curves is not now known, but it is knowable. So
with some eﬀort we can estimate the shape of cumulative availability
curves. Indeed, a few such studies have recently become available—for
lithium (Yaksic and Tilton, 2009; Jasiński et al., 2017), petroleum
(Aguilera et al., 2009), PGMs (Jasiński et al., 2017), iron ore (Pustov
et al., 2013), thorium (Jordan et al., 2015), tellurium (Redlinger et al.,
2013), and indium (Lokanc et al., 2015).
Just knowing the shape of cumulative availability curve can provide
useful insights into the likely future threat of mineral depletion. When
the curve possesses the benign shape shown in Fig. 2a, production costs
and hence prices are not likely to rise substantially even if consumption
increases rapidly and technology fails to shift the cumulative avail-
ability curve downward.
According to Yaksic and Tilton (2009), this is the case with lithium.
Fig. 3 shows the cumulative availability curve that they estimate for
this mineral commodity under high-cost and low-cost scenarios. The
vertical broken line indicates cumulative lithium consumption over the
period 2008–2100 for the world as a whole under very optimistic
projections for the use of lithium in hybrid and all electric vehicles. At
somewhere between 7.50 and 10.00 (2007) dollars a pound for lithium
carbonate, they ﬁnd that the extraction of lithium from seawater be-
comes economic. For all practical purposes, seawater is an inﬁnite
source of supply. So, at these costs, their curves become horizontal and
extend to the right far beyond the cumulative quantities shown in the
ﬁgure.
This means that, should the demand for lithium increase at un-
precedented rates over the next several decades as some are predicting,
the price of lithium could increase perhaps by 50 percent from its
present level but no more. This, according to Yaksic and Tilton, would
not signiﬁcantly increase the costs of vehicles powered by lithium
batteries, nor greatly curtail the demand for lithium.
Of course, for other mineral commodities, the shape of the cumu-
lative availability curve may not be so benign. Curves constructed for
the PGMs, for example, rise much more rapidly with cumulative output
(Janiński et al., 2017). So mineral depletion could pose a more serious
threat to their long-run availability.
As noted earlier, this may also be the case for many commodities
now produced as byproducts. Gallium, for example, is extracted as a
byproduct of bauxite and zinc ores. Should the demand for gallium
increase beyond what is available from these sources, prices might have
to rise sharply to cover the higher costs of main product output. Here
again, the shape of the cumulative availability curve could tell us much
about the potential threat of depletion.
There is, however, an important asymmetry between mineral
commodities with and without benign (i.e., quite ﬂat) cumulative
availability curves. For the former, we can with conﬁdence conclude
Fig. 2. Illustrative cumulative supply curves.
Fig. 3. Cumulative availability curves for lithium under high and low cost scenarios with
predicted cumulative demand from 2008 to 2100a. Note: aCosts are in 2007 U.S. dollars.
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that mineral depletion does not pose a signiﬁcant threat. Even if de-
mand increases rapidly and new technology fails to shift the curve
downward, future production costs should not rise greatly above cur-
rent levels. For commodities whose cumulative availability curves rise
appreciably with output, though, we cannot conclude that mineral
depletion will necessarily create future shortages. This will be the case
only if new technology is unable to oﬀset the negative eﬀects of de-
pletion.
5. Conclusions
We believe the modestly optimistic perspective described above is
more useful than the more pessimistic perspective in assessing the fu-
ture availability of mineral commodities. It focuses on prices and costs
rather than physical supply. It distinguishes between temporary or
short-run shortages (which are quite common and occur for numerous
reasons) and long-run shortages (which are due to mineral depletion
and have been so rare historically that we have found no examples to
cite).
Short-run shortages are largely due to the inherent nature of short-
run mineral commodity supply and demand. Once output approaches
full capacity, neither is very responsive to changes in price. So a shock
to either causes large changes in the market-clearing price. Public po-
licies to avoid and mitigate such shortages have not been very suc-
cessful. The sharp price increases shortages provoke are probably the
best antidote, as they encourage new supply and curtail demand in
numerous ways. They also provide strong incentives for ﬁrms and
others to reduce their risks by maintaining stockpiles, resorting to ﬁ-
nancial derivatives such as hedging, and undertaking R&D as an in-
surance policy against future market shocks.
Under the modestly optimistic perspective, long-run shortages due
to mineral depletion are not inevitable. New technology has in the past
oﬀset the adverse eﬀects of mineral depletion, and may continue to do
so in the future. Moreover, if long-run shortages do occur, they should
manifest themselves by persistent increases in real costs over decades,
slowly choking oﬀ demand in one end use after another. So society is
not likely to be caught by surprise, but instead should have some time
to respond once long-run shortages become apparent.
For these reasons, the search for public policies at this time to cope
with possible but uncertain long-term shortages should focus on those
policies justiﬁed by externalities and other market failures. In parti-
cular, the modestly optimistic perspective would favor policies that
foster innovation and new technologies that have the potential to in-
crease and enhance the eﬃciency of primary production, to improve
manufacturing eﬃciency and recycling, and develop substitutes. These
innovations alone oﬀer the possibility of keeping mineral depletion at
bay indeﬁnitely.
This perspective also suggests that a better understanding of cu-
mulative availability curves provides a more reliable approach to
identifying those mineral commodities most threatened by mineral
depletion than does estimating commodity life expectancies based on
reserves, resources, remaining URRs, or other estimates of the available
or existing ﬁxed stock.
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